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Abstract 
According to Jean-Luc Nancy, a deconstruction of Christianity looks for the ‘unthought’ in the 
christian religion. By this unthought dimension he means ‘something’ in Christianity that at the same 
time ‘is not Christianity proper’ and ‘has not mingled with it’. It appears to be simultaneously outside 
and inside Christianity. At the same time, this unthought undermines and ‘exhausts’ Christianity, and 
it would be this self-exhaustion that would be a key characteristic of Christianity; it follows that a 
deconstruction of Christianity primarily investigates the way Christianity deconstructs itself. In this 
article, the thesis is developed that this complex, unthought structure of Christianity (1) expresses 
Christianity’s modern status, and (2) is expressed in the nucleus of the christian traditions, namely in 
the ways in which Christianity deals with the name, the experience and the concept of God. This is 
demonstrated – in dialogue with Nancy’s work – by offering short analyses of the christian doctrines 
of the Creation and of the Trinity. These analyses show that the christian God ‘incarnates’ in various 
concrete ways the structure of being outside and inside: outside as well as inside Himself, the world, 
and even outside and inside Christianity. Shaped by this double bind, the unthought God is always a 
retreating God. 
 
 
1. Introduction: Christianity’s ‘unthought’ 
In 2002, in an interview in the German magazine Lettre International, Jean-Luc Nancy 
defines his project of a deconstruction of Christianity as follows. It is, as he states, the 
determination of ‘something’ (etwas) in Christianity that would have ‘made it possible’, but 
that, at the same time would be the ‘unthought’ of Christianity: that is to say, something in 
Christianity that at the same time ‘is not Christianity proper’ and ‘has not mingled with it’. 
What could this remarkable feature of Christianity be, that Nancy locates simultaneously 
within and beyond this religion, as if this beyond belongs to Christianity in the form of what 
does not and can never belong to it? 
Then, in the next sentence, Nancy adds to these rather complex formulations an even more 
difficult one. He states that the unthought of Christianity should be understood as something 
that can only be grasped in its ‘coming’ (im Kommen).1 So, the deconstruction of Christianity 
                                                 
1
 ‘Entzug der Göttlichkeit. Zur Dekonstruktion und Selbstüberschreitung des Christentums’, in Lettre 
International, winter 2002, 76-80, 76: ‘…was das Christentum möglich gemacht hat (und mit ihm das, 
was die gesamten abendländischen Zivilisation strukturiert hat), was aber gleichzeitig nicht das 
Christentum selber wäre und sich nicht mit ihm vermischt hätte – etwas, was das noch im Kommen 
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involves a focus on two structures of thought: firstly, that of inside versus outside, and 
secondly, that of being or presence versus coming. In the complexity of Nancy’s approach of 
these classic structures, one immediately perceives that both are deconstructed themselves, to 
the extent that they lose their oppositional rigor; the outside2 is something contaminating the 
inside from within, and on the other hand the inside can only be understood as something 
opening itself towards an outside described as its condition (möglich machen)3 and its 
movement (im Kommen). In is never in, and out never out. Surely, this complex and open 
structure of the unthought does neither coincide with Christianity’s ‘construction’ – its 
historical traditions, doctrines and institutions – nor does it transcend it; the unthought, in 
other words, is neither simply present in, nor radically absent from (beyond) Christianity, but 
it deconstructs the latter’s construction right from its nucleus. 
However, this unthought inside and outside Christianity, as Nancy thinks it, is not the hidden 
essence of the christian religion leading eventually to its fulfilment in time, but refers to its 
exhaustion.4 It is not of the order of an origin or of a destination, but belongs to its logic of 
self-undermining or, as Nancy puts it elsewhere, of its ‘self-overcoming’.5 In turn, this logic 
parallels the logic of what Nancy describes as the ‘entire structure of western civilization’ 
(abendländische Zivilisation)6: both Christianity and western culture as a whole are 
characterized by a dynamic of self-exhaustion, which according to Nancy achieves its radical 
form in modern, secular times. In this sense, Christianity’s unthought which keeps ‘coming’ 
to and from it, makes us aware of its close interwovenness with modernity – aware of its 
being a modern religion. 
Hence, the philosophical project of a deconstruction of Christianity has two key objects of 
investigation: first of all the unthought of Christianity and its complex structure, and next the 
                                                                                                                                                        
begriffene Ungedachte des Christentums selbst wäre.’ 
2
 Outside Christianity in the sense Nancy formulates it in the interview (see note 1): ‘that what has not 
mingled with it’ – and I would add: what can never mingle with it according to a logic of presence. 
3
 One should speak here of a continuous ‘opening of possibility’, of an active and dynamic ‘making 
possible’, in other words, of a beginning or starting point that ‘begins time and again’, rather than of a 
stable and pre-existent ‘condition’. Considered this way, the ‘condition’ is part of the movement 
(Kommen) instead of preceding it; it is an unconditional condition. See on the problem of the outside 
as an unthought possibility, promise or even revelation also below, section 7, esp. note 32. 
4
 The French terms used by Nancy are épuisement and esp. exhaustion: see e.g. ‘Une foi de rien du 
tout’, in La déclosion. Déconstruction du christianisme I , Paris: Galilée 2005, esp. 102. See also the 
Introduction in this issue by Ignaas Devisch and Aukje van Rooden, ‘Deconstruction, Dis-enclosure, 
and Christianity’. 
5
 See ‘The Deconstruction of Christianity’, in H. de Vries, S. Weber (eds.), Religion and Media, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001, 112-130, 114; orig. 1998, republished in La déclosion, 203-
226. 
6
 See note 1. 
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ways in which this unthought questions the relation between Christianity and secular 
modernity. 
 
2. Between the end and the beginning of religion 
Almost ten years earlier than the 2002 interview, in a key paragraph in The Sense of the 
World, Nancy relates this modern unthought of Christianity with the end of premodern 
Christianity. He defines a deconstruction of Christianity as a project unmasking and 
interrupting the christian experience of sense, so that a new insight in the way sense ‘works’ 
in modernity becomes possible.7 Whereas the Christian-medieval era, according to Nancy, 
received sense ultimately outside this life (the afterlife), outside this world (the Kingdom), 
and outside history (the eschaton, the ‘Last Day’), modern secular culture has no option but to 
affirm and expose to the sense in and of this world. This commitment to the here and now is 
modernity’s trouble and challenge. Sense is being disconnected from its non-worldly Giver, 
and it is simple there without the gift of a transcendent Giver. Here the deconstruction of 
Christianity seems primarily directed towards clearing up the christian veils that would block 
a new, modern understanding of sense. In the same paragraph Nancy speaks of an 
‘abandonment without return’ of everything that is present in the Christ figure: that is, of ‘all 
hypostasis of sense’.8 The complex formulations of the 2002 interview seem to be opposed 
here by a critical definition aimed at disrupting Christianity, limiting its historical meaning 
and influence. This parallels Nancy’s multiple statements about the presumed ‘end of 
Christianity’. But is it that straightforward, first of all according to Nancy himself? Is this 
‘end’ really an end?9 
One might place both definitions in chronological order, discarding the older one in favour of 
the newer. That would imply that one of the key theses of The Sense of the World would have 
been abandoned by Nancy; this clearly is not the case, for his concept of sense in relation with 
the modern condition is very much at work in his later and recent publications.10 Furthermore, 
                                                 
7
 The Sense of the World, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1997, 54-58; orig. 1993. See on 
this paragraph also the Introduction in this issue. 
8
 The Sense of the World, 55, note 50. 
9
 In a dialogue with Nancy, Jacques Derrida also quotes and comments the aforementioned paragraph 
from The Sense of the World, interrogating Nancy about his view on the possibility of an opposition 
between (premodern) Christianity and modernity. Derrida is critical with regard to any notion of an 
‘abandonment without return’ of Christianity: ‘Le mot “sens” paraît d’une part lié à ce christianisme 
qu’il faut abandonner. Mais une fois que l’on a abandonné le christianisme, on garde néanmoins le 
mot “sens” déchristianisé, si j’ose dire, il le faut encore. (…) Autrement dit, tu sembles vouloir sauver 
le sens après sa déchristianisation tout en disant, dans d’autres textes, que la déchristianisation est une 
opération d’autodéconstruction, c’est-à-dire encore chrétienne…’ See Francis Guibal, Jean-Clet 
Martin (eds.), Sens en tous sens. Autour des travaux de Jean-Luc Nancy, Paris: Galilée 2004, 186-187. 
10
 See e.g. The Creation of the World or Globalization, New York: Suny Press 2007 (orig. 2002), and 
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the author of The Sense of the World warns us already in the same paragraph, that a 
deconstruction of Christianity is ‘something other than a critique or a demolition’.11 It may be 
more correct, then, to try and think this end of Christianity and of its experience of sense as 
something already present in Christianity. In that case, an opposition of modernity and 
Christianity – the latter’s end being the beginning of the former – would become pointless. It 
would be more worthwhile to explore the ways in which Christianity bears its own end within 
itself – an end that marks a never-ending beginning. This ambivalence is expressed, for 
example, in the way Christianity oscillates, from its earliest, its medieval to its modern phase, 
between an affirmation of sense outside and of sense inside the world. The life of the christian 
receives a powerful fulfilment as a form of care for oneself in the here and now and as 
responsibility for the earth, as for example Augustin teaches in his Confessions and Erasmus 
in his Enchiridion; but an equally forceful fulfilment is found in the longing for a life and 
sense outside the self and outside this world, as has been evoked by the chiliast movements, 
by numerous mystical traditions or by early modern puritanism. 
But how to connect the philosophical announcement of the end of Christianity − of the end of 
its experience of sense − with the philosophical announcement of the unthought in 
Christianity that is still coming and more importantly, has always been coming? How to read 
the end as something never-ending? In order to come to terms with these questions and 
prepare for possible answers, we need to turn our attention to the christian God, or rather, to 
the ways in which Christianity deals with the name, the experience and the concept of God. 
For the unthought of Christianity analyzed so far is expressed mostly in its complex God. 
 
3. A God who wants to get rid of God 
The deconstruction of Christianity can be described as the determination of a radical 
ambivalence within Christianity, within its history, its theology, its doctrine, its rituals, its art: 
an ambivalence through which Christianity deconstructs itself. Hence, a deconstructive 
analysis of Christianity studies primarily Christianity’s autodeconstruction as its basic 
characteristic.12  
This ambivalence consists in the fact that the christian religion has itself, and from its very 
beginning − a beginning that should be traced back beyond the beginning of Christianity, in 
its Jewish and Greek roots − a double relation to the possibility, or rather, to the event of 
sense. This double bind of sense comes to the fore in Christianity’s double experience of its 
God. On the one hand, it is almost obsessively occupied with the here and now of sense, that 
is, in the intimacy of our personal relation with Christ and his flesh and blood; here, no 
outside is necessary, for the outside is inside. The unthought, the unheard of that which is ‘in 
                                                                                                                                                        
the interview ‘Rien que le monde’ in Vacarme 11, Spring 2000. 
11
 The Sense of the World, 55, note 50. 
12
 See also below, note 30. 
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coming’ (im Kommen), is in and since Christ always already there. On the other hand, 
Christianity remains totally devoted to the experience of a sense that is not of this world and 
transcends time and history: God’s heavenly Kingdom is only one of the relevant metaphors 
here. In this second sense the outside is so radically transcendent that no relation to it is 
possible: only an experience of distance and of waiting remains. In sum, the christian God is 
‘so close and yet so far’.  
In a parallel way the christian concept of the parousia, of Christ’s appearance and subsequent 
presence in the world, with and among us, should be read in a double meaning, which would 
also be consistent with its traditional use. Christ’s parousia refers to both his presence in the 
world, close to us, and his coming presence – his presence as coming – outside the world, that 
is, when he will finally gloriously return at the end of time. The first meaning of parousia is 
usually associated with the story and symbolism of the Cross, the second with the apocalyptic 
images and visions evoked in the last book of the New Testament. But a double parousia can 
never be a full presence. Though to many believers probably in a very unorthodox way, 
Nancy rightly points out that parousia should be thought in its literal meaning of a presence 
that falls short of being present: of a presence (ousia) that remains close but at a distance (par-
). God’s presence in Christ is a presence of retreat13: the retreat from being as the only 
possible ‘mode’ of being.14 
As is abundantly clear from the first chapters of La déclosion, Nancy defends an 
understanding of Christianity that problematizes the opposition of religion and atheism.15 
Christianity is an atheism, Nancy attempts to demonstrate, because in it a fundamental retreat 
from religion is present and active. Why? Surely both sides, both extremes of the double bind 
explored above lead toward this retreat. The continuous deregulation of the inside-outside 
scheme, of the dualism of an innerworldly and a non-worldly sense, results in a religion that 
first of all enacts the death of God: the christian God dies in the intimacy of his becoming 
human in Christ, as well as in the infinite distance of his absence. The retreat consists of 
proximity and distance. In other words, because Christianity cannot choose between a present 
God and an absent God, this religion challenges the idea of a religion proper; for what 
remains of a religion that is devoted to the death of God? I suggest that it is in this direction 
that Nancy interprets the well-known dictum of Marcel Gauchet: Christianity, as the religion 
                                                 
13
 The double meaning of this term should be kept alive: retreat as withdrawal, and as dealing with 
(treating) something/someone again (re-), in other words: re-addressing. It indicates a turning away as 
well as a turning towards. The French word retrait contains the same contradictory meanings; 
however, in the German Auszug/Entzug the second meaning is lost. 
14
 See ‘Entzug der Göttlichkeit’, 80. 
15
 See in particular La déclosion, ‘Athéisme et monothéisme’, 27-46, and ‘Déconstruction du 
monothéisme’, 47-64, translated from an earlier version as ‘Deconstruction of monotheism’ in 
Postcolonial Studies 6-1, 2003, 37-46. 
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of the West, is ‘la religion de la sortie de la religion’.16 Christianity does not oppose atheism, 
it forms no counterforce against the ‘disenchantment of the world’, but accompanies it or, as 
Karl Löwith would state, has actually led to it.17 
 
Well before the publication of La déclosion Nancy has already been involved in this complex 
exploration of Christianity’s retreating God. This is indicated, for example, by two interesting 
footnotes in Being Singular Plural.18 Just as the aforementioned paragraph and footnote in 
The Sense of the World, both footnotes refer to a future project called the deconstruction of 
Christianity, but the second footnote deals also briefly with the christian doctrine of the 
Trinity. I hold the view that this strange dogma formulated by the early Church and never 
after abolished or even revised seriously, may add to the clarification of the double bind just 
mentioned. If so, a deconstruction of Christianity cannot do without a deconstruction of the 
Trinity.  
I will first present and comment the complex and sometimes cryptic paragraph in Being 
Singular Plural to which this second footnote belongs. Subsequently, in section 5, I will 
compare Nancy’s remark on the Trinity with his view on the christian theology of the 
Creation. Finally, in section 6 and 7, I will formulate a few opening analyses to a 
deconstruction of the Trinitarian God. In doing so, I aim to explore new paths or side-paths in 
the deconstruction of Christianity, staying close to Nancy but going my own way as well. 
 
 
 
4. The God who is ‘being-with’ 
The paragraph in Being Singular Plural deals with one of Nancy’s main subjects: the meaning 
of ‘ensemble’, of ‘together’, of ‘être-avec’, of ‘being-with’. Nancy states that the word 
‘ensemble’ always ‘oscillates’ between two obvious assumptions: either it is thought as a 
relation to something/someone outside, as a ‘juxtaposition of isolated parts’ or entities, or it is 
thought as a relation that encompasses the relata or relati (those who relate) in a fusional 
‘unified totality’ by which the relation itself is being absorbed and transformed into ‘pure 
substance’: that is, into a pure inside. Although Nancy describes the restless oscillation 
between these extremes as an inevitable predicament of western thought, he also affirms this 
oscillation as an important feature of the ‘ensemble’ – maybe its only feature. For ‘being-
                                                 
16
 ‘Religion retreating from religion.’ See M. Gauchet, Le désenchantement du monde. Une histoire 
politique de la religion, Paris: Gallimard 1985, 133-232, transl. As The disenchantment of the world : 
A Political History of Religion, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997. 
17
 See e.g. Löwith’s Christentum und Geschichte, Düsseldorf 1955. 
18
 See Being Singular Plural, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2000, 16, note 20 and 60, note 52; 
orig. 1996. 
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with’ defies the structure of outside and inside; it is neither extra, nor intra, and both 
simultaneously. Any thought of a pure outside or a pure inside precludes the possibility of the 
‘ensemble’, Nancy claims. 
‘Both [a pure outside and pure inside – LtK] suppose a unique and isolated pure substance, in 
such a way that one cannot even say ‘isolated’, exactly because one would be deprived of all 
relation with it.’19 
Against this God that is identical to a pure substance − inside, as in the pantheist option20, or 
outside: think of the Being above or beyond Being characteristic of negative theology − 
Nancy now hints at a different God. This he does in the footnote. This different God, who is 
‘together’ with the world neither in the form of a pure outside nor of a pure inside, might be 
the trinitarian God of Christianity. In this concept of God, Nancy suggests tentatively, the 
‘ensemble’ is not thought as substance, but as a relational dynamics, an ‘oscillation’ within 
God himself. The divinity of this God is togetherness proper: ‘Being-with of the onto-
theological species’.21 
This God is not a subject, according to the logic of the pure outside: not an isolated identity 
temporarily entering a relation; equally, this God is not the absorption of all subjectivity in a 
totum, according to the logic of the pure inside: not a fusion of identities that makes any 
relation superfluous. In this sense, this God is ‘no longer “God”’, as Nancy writes in the 
footnote. Still, the trinitarian God, whoever or whatever he may be, is a God. What strange 
God is this trinitarian God then? In La déclosion Nancy treats the question of this strange God 
by discussing the meaning of monotheism. He rephrases the formulations of our footnote in 
Being Singular Plural, and in doing so, persistently speaks about the God of christian 
monotheism. We will discover that here again, the trinitarian God creeps in. 
‘…the “One” of “God” is not at all Unicity as a substantial thing, present and joined to itself: 
on the contrary, the unicity and the unity of this “god” (or the divinity of this “one”) consists 
precisely in the fact that the One can be neither posited, presented nor figured as conjoined in 
itself [réuni en soi]. Be it in exile and diaspora, be it in the becoming-man and in a being-
threefold-in-itself (…), this “god” (…) absolutely excludes its own presentation (…).’22 
So the monotheistic God, of which the trinitarian God seems to be a further expression 
according to Nancy, is no one in itself − not ‘conjoined in itself’. Clearly, since the trinitarian 
                                                 
19
 Being Singular Plural, 60. 
20
 From which Nancy excludes, remarkably enough, Spinoza and Leibniz. In their work one would 
encounter a concept of God that defies the structure of outside and inside and that proposes a God that 
is no ‘God’ seen as substance or identity. Their God, Nancy claims, follows the logic of the 
‘ensemble’ as described above: He is the ensemble. Hence, their God ‘is not together with anything or 
anyone (…)’, but He is ‘the togetherness or being-together of all that is: God is not “God”.’ (60) 
21
 One discovers that Nancy suggests a close proximity between his own thinking on the christian God 
and that of Spinoza and Leibniz: see note 20. 
22
 ‘Deconstruction of monotheism’, 46. 
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God falls apart in three persons, it cannot be thought as a single ‘person’ in the sense of an 
isolated and self-indulgent subject, nor as an all-absorbing totum. It has a complexity to its 
being that is caused by its being-three-in-one: its being seems to be a being-with or being-
together in a fundamental way.  
 
5. The unthought God as the God of Creation 
Elsewhere Nancy demonstrates the not-being-one-in-itself of God by means of an analysis of 
the God of Creation, e.g. again in Being Singular Plural23, and later in The Creation of the 
World.  
Nancy’s interpretation of the christian narrative and subsequent doctrine of the creation of the 
world is provocative to the extent that the relation between creator and creation is not one of 
subject and object. The sense of the world as a created world consists in the enigma that the 
‘creator becomes indistinct from his creation’.24 Or, formulated more radically: there is no 
God outside or before the event of the creation. Again, outside is inside, and the reverse. This 
event, in which the protagonists of the creation story (God and Adam, the humans; creator and 
creatures) are always already involved − they do not exist prior to it, nor as a result of it −, is 
the nihil of what has later been named the creatio ex nihilo, as Nancy sees it.  
In fact, if the creation is ex nihilo, this does not signify that a ‘creator’ operates ‘starting from 
nothing’. As a rich and complex tradition demonstrates, this fact instead signifies two things: 
on the one hand, it signifies that the ‘creator’ itself is the nihil; on the other, it signifies that 
this nihil is not, logically speaking, something ‘from which’ what is created would come 
[provenir], but the coming [provenance] itself (…).25 
So the ex nihilo is the event of the coming, of the coming into being, and of being-as-coming 
(provenir, provenance). This may add to our understanding of Nancy’s complex formulation 
in the 2002 interview I quoted at the beginning, that the unthought of Christianity can only be 
grasped as something or someone constantly coming (im Kommen), moving and passing only 
to retreat again: the unthought of the christian narrative of creation consists in the fact that 
creation is an act or event of ‘coming itself’.  
The ex nihilo is, in other words, the event of the relation in which God and humans, heaven 
and earth, outside and inside meet. In this meeting their being op-posed shifts to a being ex-
posed to one another, thereby problematizing the closure of their identities. In this event, God 
is indeed no one in itself, but exists only in his gift of the creation, that is, in his giving 
himself away – ‘himself’ defined as the coming of the event of the creation.26 Can we 
                                                 
23
 See 15-21. 
24
 Ibidem, 15. 
25
 Ibidem, 16. I have changed the rather awkward translation of this sentence a bit, rendering it more 
literal. 
26
 The same could be said of the identity of humans in the creation, that is, of Adam (Hebrew for 
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demonstrate this same structure by focusing on the Trinity? Do we find a similar enigma 
here? 
 
6. The unthought God as a trinitarian God 
The concept of the Trinity can Ibe rephrased as a specific treatment of the problem we have 
been occupied with up to this point: how to portray a God that is ‘so close and yet so far’, in 
whom the sense of the world becomes apparent as a new involvement between outside and 
inside? For the Trinity bears as its central issue the event of the incarnation, of the becoming 
human of a God who, as such, in this becoming, still is God. In this sense the Trinity is an 
intriguing and troubling feature of christian theology: in it the unthought of Christianity, as 
analyzed earlier, is articulated in a formal, doctrinal manner, leading to its creed of a complex, 
multiple God. In this sense, the unthought of Christianity indeed resides primarily in its 
unthought God. How and why did this concept emerge? 
The Trinity, as is well known, consists of three persons: (1) God, the Father, (2) Christ, his 
Son, who left his father to enter the world and become human, and (3) the Holy Spirit, which 
is the spirit of Christ left in the world to blow among humans after the Son had returned to his 
Father. In this formal summary of the concept, the Trinity reflects the threefold order of the 
biblical history. Firstly, the Jewish God of the Old Testament, the God of the creation, the law 
and the prophets (the Father) sends himself away in the figure of his son to become human. 
Secondly, this becoming human forms the material for the New Testament gospels telling the 
story of Christ. And thirdly, after Christ’s ascension back to heaven, his Spirit lives on in the 
world: the stories of the concluding books of the New Testament.  
So far, things are pretty straightforward. The Trinity would, according to this formal 
approach, be a linear structure, an image of a chronology: from outside to inside and back 
outside; from God to humanity and back to God. However, it becomes a lot more complex as 
soon as we recognize that the early church has always presented the Trinity as a threefold 
God: the Father, the Son and the Spirit are three gods within one. There is no question of a 
God temporarily leaving his divine topos only to return to it later on: the leaving itself is 
                                                                                                                                                        
human being). Peter Sloterdijk elaborates this double problem of identity (of creator and creature, God 
and humans) in his Sphären, vol. I: Blasen, Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp 1998, esp. 31-45. Sloterdijk 
defines the creation, as imagined in the opening narratives of the jewish and christian bible, as an 
event between God and Adam which consists in a ‘ursprüngliches Hin und Her reden, bei dem es 
keinen ersten Pol geben kann’ (41). Hence, the creator is not the subject of the creation, but 
subjectivity ‘happens’, ‘begins’ or ‘comes’ (to use Nancy’s vocabulary) in a shared event – Sloterdijk 
speaks of Teilung, which reminds of the important concept of partage (sharing, dividing, separating) 
in Nancy. ‘In der intimen Teilung der Subjektivität durch ein Paar (…) treten Zweites und Erstes 
immer nur gemeinsam hervor. Wo das Zweite nicht eintrifft, war auch das Erste nicht gegeben. Daraus 
folgt: Wer Schöpfer sagt, ohne Adams vorgängige Koexistenz mit ihm zu betonen, hat sich bereits in 
einen ursprungsmonarchischen Irrtum verlaufen.’ (42
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called God. In other words, God is God, but the human person in the Trinity, Christ, is equally 
God, as is his Spirit. And consequently: if the human person is human, than God is human as 
is the Spirit. Here, in the confessing and worshipping of a threefold God the scheme of an 
outside- and an inside-the-world begins to crumble. 
Traces of this complex God can already be found in the New Testament, e.g. in Paul’s letters 
to the Corinthians, and subsequently in a more explicit way in the writings of Tertullian in the 
second and of Origines in the third century. Whereas the former, standing in the tradition of 
Aristotelian metaphysics, emphasized God as ‘One Substance’ in whom three persons were 
embedded, the latter adopted a more free approach to the Trinity, by declaring the unity of 
three different and distinctive divine persons related to each other in an interplay. Already for 
Origines the incarnated, human God (Christ) and his Spirit were the central modalities of the 
trinitarian God; to him the Father-God remained in the background, as a transcendent creator 
of humans, while the Son-God was their redeemer, the Spirit of this Son their sanctifier.  
But it was at the Council of Nicea in 325 and later of Constantinople in 381 that the first 
trinitarian creed was formulated by theologians like Alexander and Athanasius27; later it was 
established further as a doctrine in the fifth century, in particular by Augustin. Now, the 
Trinity is not an invention out of the blue. It is a heavy compromise that has emerged slowly 
within a fierce debate in the first centuries of the church on the status or ‘nature’ of Christ. If 
Christ is the central figure of the christian religion, should he simply be God or simply a 
human being? The former position was taken by the tradition called docetism, the latter by 
arianism. The theologians present at these Councils developed a compromise between the two 
positions, first in the famous dogma ‘Vere homo, vere deus’: Christ is both divine and human 
at the same time and this forever. Subsequently this compromise was placed into a coherent 
structure: the Trinity.  
The historical background, in as far it can be reconstructed28, leads us back first of all to the 
early Christians’ resistance against the sacrality of the Roman emperor. Then still illegal and 
oppressed, the Christians needed to distinguish their God from the Ruler of the Empire, who, 
since Augustus, was proclaimed to be God on earth: to be the fusion of the divine and the 
human world, which gave him absolute power. Christ could hardly be a similar fusion of God 
                                                 
27
 The 381 creed is a much more elaborated version, which has become the standard text in the 
Christian liturgy. 
28
 Research on the historical and political context of the debates on the Trinity are still rather rare. I 
just mention a few recent studies that are important to me: Susanne Hausammann, Gottes Dreiheit – 
des Menschen Freiheit. Trinität, Anfänge des Mönchtums, Augustinus und Augustinismus, 
Neukirchen/Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag 2003; R. Letham, The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, 
Theology and Worship, Phillipsburg NJ: P&R 2004; William G. Rusch’s edition with commentaries 
The Trinitarian Controversy, Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1980; and of course the older, famous study 
by Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, and Incarnation, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1976 (orig. 1956). 
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and humans, so the gospel narratives were interpreted, e.g. by docetist and on the other side 
arianist movements, into a direction wherein he was seen as either pure divine or pure human, 
pure ‘exterior’ or pure ‘interior’ ‘substance’ – to take Nancy’s words from the footnote in 
Being Singular Plural I discussed earlier. The trinitarian theologians opposed these one-sided 
views and attempted to formulate a different entanglement of God and humans – different 
from the fusion presented in the Emperor. They experimented with a notion of entanglement 
in which both identities were constantly problematized in stead of being synthesized and 
neutralized. The enigmatic trinitarian God, I repeat, was seen as a God who opposes his own 
deity, who gives himself away to become human, and as such, as a non-God, was considered 
God. This enigmatic God was seen as a much firmer and more effective resistance against the 
Emperor-God than the rigid dualisms of the docetists or the arianists.  
In the fourth century the doctrine of the Trinity was shaped in its definite and influential form 
in a period when the Church shook off its illegal status and became the dominant religion of 
the Empire. Consequently, the first theologians of the new, powerful church aimed to 
formulate a God that could replace and succeed the Emperor-God convincingly. Also, it 
became necessary for the new, christian emperors as well as for the first popes to ground their 
power in the idea of being an earthly representative of Christ and of his apostles: thus, outside 
and inside had to be brought together in a certain way. Christ himself needed to be thought in 
a radical incarnational structure, in which his divinity and humanity were his double truth.29 
 
7. The Trinity as a theology of retreat: incarnation, revelation, kenosis 
The Trinity presents a God that consists of ‘leaving himself’, I stated above. After having 
explored briefly the historical soil of the debates on the Trinity, let us now explore – again 
briefly, by means of some preliminary thoughts – we can now turn final attention to why 
Christianity, in its eventual choice for the trinitarian God figure, is a religion that retreats from 
itself – that deconstructs itself.30 
The narrative of the incarnated God is not only the centre of the christian religion, but it is 
also its distinctive feature as compared to other religions and even to the other monotheisms. 
Nancy indicates this time and again in his texts on the deconstruction of Christianity. The 
                                                 
29
 In a similar way, Nancy compares the outside-inside-complexity of the christian God with that of 
the sovereign. See e.g. ‘D’un Wink divin’, in La déclosion, 158-159. 
30
 Indeed the deconstruction of Christianity and of its theological doctrine – like the Trinity – is not 
primarily an act to be performed and conducted by an agent or subject in the here and now: by us 
philosophers or scientists e.g. First of all, it is something inherent to Christianity proper, as Nancy 
points out; hence, he speaks of the autodeconstruction of the monotheist religions, and in particular of 
Christianity (see e.g. The Sense of the World, 55, note 50, quoted earlier), and elaborated in ‘The 
Deconstruction of Christianity’, esp. 121-122). Deconstructivist analysis as an active academic 
practice can be nothing more than a way of demonstrating this autodeconstructive dynamic and make 
it explicit.  
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incarnation disorders the classic, hierarchic relation between gods and humans by introducing 
an infinite thanatography – a story about dying. God dies as God only to regain life as human: 
but this human then dies (on the cross) only to live again as God. However, this deceased and 
resurrected God can no longer be a ‘normal’ God, for he cannot be worshipped but in the 
shape of the one who humiliated himself and refrained from being God. Death of God, death 
of humans: these two events structure Christianity, precisely in their endless repetition. 
Maybe the Trinity should be understood, more than as a concept or dogma, as the story of this 
double event, the narrative of the incarnation. 
In this context Nancy also speaks of the ambivalence of the christian revelation. Christianity 
does not start from a straightforward and concrete revelation of a God, supported by an 
originary holy text or by witnesses; The God that wants to get rid of himself reveals himself 
only as emptiness, as ‘the Open as such’, as Nancy names it.31 Despite the multiple 
experiences of divine appearance or divine intervention by Christians throughout the history 
of this religion, revelation in Christianity does not have a subject or object, but refers to 
something that never ‘is’ but that ‘is’ to come. This ‘something’ is nothing in itself, but 
revelation proper. Revelation reveals the possibility of revelation, just as the creation, as we 
saw Nancy formulate earlier on, creates nothing in itself, but the possibility of creation. 
Neither a revealing instance, a creator, a subject, nor a revealed, created entity, an object, are 
articulated here; but in between these two the possibility, the promise, the event, that is: the 
possibility and the promise as event, as the gift and kairos of revelation. As soon as a subject 
threatens to overtake and appropriate this empty possibility, as soon as an object threatens to 
fill it with realization, both structuring events of Christianity – death of God, death of humans 
– question and even disarm these appropriations.32 
                                                 
31
 ‘The Deconstruction of Christianity’, 121. 
32
 Needless to say, this approach of revelation refers to Heidegger’s distinction of Offenbarung 
(revelation) and Offenbarkeit (usually translated as revealability), in Being and Time (1927), and more 
prominently in his text ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ (from the same year), later published in 
Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, 39-62 (orig. 
Wegmarken, 1978). The emphasis on the possibility and the promise of revelation, that is, on its 
revealability rather than on what/who may be revealed, is central to Nancy’s deconstruction of 
Christianity, just as the emphasis on ‘messianicity’ as opposed to messianism is crucial to Derrida’s 
work (e.g. in ‘Faith and Knowledge’, in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, Religion, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 1998, 16; orig. 1996); the ‘fact’ of revelation is its coming, here and now, 
however not as a substance appropriable to a certain religious tradition or group, but only as 
possibility, as a ‘not yet’. A radical thinking of the difference between the old Aristotelian modalities 
of potentiality and of substance is at stake here. Nevertheless, both thinkers also formulate their 
reservations with this rigorous distinction, e.g. in the dialogue quoted above (see note 9). Derrida 
states: ‘Ce couple-là, Offenbarkeit/Offenbarung (…) est un couple diabolique, très difficile à maîtriser. 
On ne peut pas décider, quant à savoir si la condition de l’Offenbarung a été l’Offenbarkeit, autrement 
dit de l’ouverture du révélable dans laquelle une révélation historique s’est inscrite, ou si, au contraire, 
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The experience of an empty revelation parallels the other experience central to Nancy’s 
thought, that of the christian God as a retreating God, with all emphasis on the ‘event’, the 
‘revelation’ of this retreat. What is revealed is a retreat, rather than a ‘God’. The prime model 
for this retreat is the concept of kenosis. God retreats by becoming human, ‘emptying himself’ 
as Paul’s letter to the Philippeans33, laying off his divinity in order to enter the human world. 
This is a remarkable feature of the idea of incarnation: for here God retreats, creating as much 
distance as possible between him and the world, between outside and inside, but this retreat 
only results in the most intimate proximity of the divine and the human, in Christ. 
Furthermore, the kenotic death of God is continued immediately in the death of the human 
being into which God had entered. Here we encounter the two aforementioned structuring 
events again. Following similar lines of thought, Nancy states that the incarnation does not 
simply mean that God becomes human, but that ‘the divine in humans becomes a dimension 
of retreat, of absence, and indeed of death’.34 
The Trinity, as much as its doctrine leans heavily on the doctrine of the incarnation and its 
complexities, reflects the problem of the latter. If the Christians worship Christ (centre and 
axe of the trinitarian structure) as their Lord, than they actually worship a double death: death 
of the Father, death of the Son – death of God, death of humans. As a strange concept of a 
threefold God that is no God, the Trinity may well be considered as the telling of a story 
rather than as a concept in the proper sense. It is the story of this double death. As was 
suggested above, the trinitarian creed of Constantinople may be rethought as the telling of a 
story rather than a confession of dogma’s.35 The spirit of this story, of this drama between 
God and humans must be told time and again. This Holy Spirit, the third person within the 
trinitarian God, the spirit of this death story, is called ‘giver of life’ in the creed. Wouldn’t it 
be one of the ‘unthought’ features of Christianity that in the fourth century the assembled 
christian communities decided that their creed could only be to believe in two deaths (of God, 
of Christ) that, surprisingly and mysteriously, ‘give life’: ‘I believe in God the Father, in Jesus 
Christ, his Son, and in the Holy Spirit, giver of life?’36 
                                                                                                                                                        
une Offenbarung, c’est-à-dire un événement est arivé, imprévisiblement, qui a ouvert la révélabilité à 
elle-même…’ See Sens en tous sens, 189. Here, the difference is rephrased as a tension articulating the 
inevitability of both terms and the undecidability between them. See on this also Hent de Vries, 
Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999, 36, 40-95. 
33
 Letter to the Philippians 2:7. 
34
 ‘Der Entzug Gottes’, 78. 
35
 This is especially true for the main part of the creed, that on Christ, which happens to be by far the 
longest part as well. Whereas the short opening lines on God the Father and the short concluding lines 
on the Spirit, the Church, Baptism and Eternal Life are phrased like theses, the lengthy middle part on 
Christ remarkably presents in the narrative form the story of his impossible birth, life, death and 
resurrection, stressing his being divine and human at the same time. 
36
 See for an interesting rethinking of the Spirit as giver or rather as ‘gifting person’ within the 
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God is the ‘story’ of a double death (of the Father, of the Son) giving life (the Spirit): here one 
observes how Christianity’s autodeconstruction and ‘self-exhaustion’ already come to light in 
the way it deconstructs its God. Christianity’s modernity and modernity’s christianity rest on 
this groundless ground. 
                                                                                                                                                        
threefold God Stephen H. Webb, The Gifting God: A Trinitarian Ethics of Excess, New York/Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1996, esp. 153-156. Here the Spirit is not merely seen as Christ’s Spirit 
remaining on earth after His death and disappearance into heaven, but as the differential economy 
itself relating the other two persons to eachother. The Spirit is not a third person, but the middle and 
mediatory person initiating and ‘organizing’ the excess of the drama that happens between the Father 
and the Son – or, in a theological generalization of this event, between God and humans –, leading to 
their giving themselves away. Indeed the Constantinople creed of 381 states in an intriguing way that 
Christ has incarnated from or by (Latin: de) the Holy Spirit, and then, in the same breath, out of (Latin: 
ex) the Virgin Mary. Through this strange double gifting movement, by a God, the Spirit, and by a 
mortal being, the virgin, Christ is offered to the world. Here it is suggested that the Spirit comes before 
Christ, whereas the verse in the creed that actually introduces the Spirit as the third divine person in 
whom to believe, follows much later in the text. 
